The perceptual base of nonalignment

NAZLI CHOUCRI

Department of Political Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario

The perceptual base of nonalignment[1]

NAZLI CHOUCRI

Department of Political Studies, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario

Almost two-thirds of the nations in the world have chosen not to join either of the two dominant alliance systems—the Communist or the Western. Most of these states, generally known as the "third world," are Afro-Asian and their nonalignment signifies freedom from constraints imposed by alliances with major powers (Rossi, 1963). While it is misleading to consider the nonaligned states as a group homogeneous in attitude and behavior, the degree of variation among them is largely an empirical question. This article examines the attitudinal orientation of three Afro-Asian nations —India, Egypt, and Indonesia—during the latter 1950s and early 1960s, an important period in the development of nonalignment. Our primary objective is to identify the more general perceptions at the base of this policy. The model of the international system implicit in our analysis is admittedly oversimplified, for the world is more complex than simply major powers and nonaligned states. However, for the purpose of systematic analysis, a parsimonious model is more useful than an intricate, though undoubtedly more realistic, portrayal of the international system.

There are many determinants of state behavior, some more compelling than others, and those with a direct impact on the prevailing attitudinal orientation are often the most significant. Many of the factors contributing to nonalliance are pertinent to alliance formation as well. A nation's selection of either position is largely a function of several interrelated considerations, such as strategic location, national capability, diplomatic status, and the like. In the last analysis, however, the *perceptual orientation* of the national leadership may well be the most significant determinant of a state's alignment or nonalignment.

Perception is the process of becoming cognizant of, and evaluating, an environment. It refers to the cognitive, evaluative, and affective awareness of various inputs from the external environment (Krech and Crutchfield, 1965). In this context, perceptions refer to the more basic assessments that decision-makers bring to bear upon the situation with which they must deal. It is the "meaning" that is attached to objects or events and provides the framework within which policies and decisions are made. Because the assignment of meaning is a crucial determinant of behavior, it is necessary to focus on some objective indices of perceptual orientation.

The adoption of nonalignment by most

of the Afro-Asian countries suggests the existence of common attitudinal characteristics uniting them in their lack of commitment to either of the major blocs. This, however, is an empirical question. States may be nonaligned for similar or for different reasons. Variations in perceptions may account for similarities in behavior, but similar perceptual orientations may also lead to different overt actions. Likewise common attitudes may lead to common behavior (Lyon, 1963; Liska, 1962). The key issue here involves the *content* of relevant attitudes. Nonalignment as a policy may be supported by a whole syndrome of perceptions only one cluster of which is shared by all nonaligned nations. We suggest that a certain portion of the attitudinal "mix" underlying this policy is common to the nonaligned states in general and that a certain portion is unique to each. Further, we argue that the overall attitudinal orientation is affected by general environmental variables, some of which are conducive to the shared perceptual base, while others contribute more particularly to each state's nonalignment.

This study seeks to identify the more general perceptions underlying the policy of nonalignment. Toward this end a model of Afro-Asian orientation in the international system is presented, taking into account behavioral as well as attitudinal dimensions. A discussion of the properties of the model precedes the empirical testing of its perceptual components.

Nonalignment in International Politics: A Model

The conceptual framework used in this study—essentially an interaction model linking sets of actions by a two-step mediation process serves as a guide—for empirical analysis (Holsti *et al.*, 1964). Our purpose

is, in the long run, to clarify the *why* and *what* of nonalignment by examining systematically various aspects of the issue. The immediate and more limited objective is to delineate the most significant perceptual dimensions of nonalliance.

In its most simple statement, the model suggests that upon becoming aware of inputs or stimuli from the environment— in terms of events, pressures, challenges and the like—national leaders formulate statements of intentions, develop plans for action, and respond accordingly. The most relevant *stimuli* in international politics are those that originate with the actions of nations and are directed toward others. A *response* is an action, or a series of actions, undertaken following some input behavior. Theoretically it is difficult to isolate sets of actions and to draw a one-to-one correspondence between them.

The *two intermediate steps* relating stimuli and responses are conceptualized in terms of (1) the actor's perceptions of input behavior, and (2) the perceptualized intentions with respect to his own actions or verbal responses. Although the model stipulates that these steps are essential prerequisites of behavior, several empirical studies have suggested the existence of thresholds delimiting the relevance of perceptual mediation (Zaninovich, 1964; Field and Choucri, 1968). Under certain conditions, notably high conflict or low salience, responses are predicated directly upon environmental influences.

On the whole, this model is a highly oversimplified characterization of interaction and should be considered primarily as a guide for data collection and evaluation.[2] At this point a discussion of nonalignment

---

[2] A critique of the model has been presented by Jervis and a defense by North (Jervis, 1967; North, 1967).

TABLE 1
AFRO-ASIAN NONALIGNMENT: A MODEL

Background conditions Stimuli Environmental context	Definition of situation	Perceptual base Frame of reference Statement of plan	Overt behavior Responses Characteristics of actions
International system: 1. Major powers 2. Nonalliance group General conflict system: 1. Cold War Alliances: 1. East and West globally 2. Regional alliances Behavior of states toward Afro-Asia: 1. Actions of ex-colonial powers 2. Actions of major powers Domestic conditions: 1. Low level of development Historical experiences: 1. Colonialism Crises and events: Vary with each state	*Characteristics* Assessment of: International system: 1. Negative and threatening Actors: 1. East and West perceived similarly 2. Afro-Asian viewed favorably Events: vary with each state Self: generally as potent as the major powers Hypothesized *neutralism*: toward major powers	*Intentions* Formulation of non-alignment: strong and active policy No alliances with major powers: 1. Behavior toward major powers predicated on actions of major powers toward self 2. Role defined in terms of mediation Impartiality	1. No alliance with a major power within the context of the general conflict system 2. No regional alliances within the context of the general conflict system 3. Alliances at the regional level between states of relatively equal capabilities 4. Judgment of international issues on their own merit

in terms of this conceptual framework precedes empirical analysis of the underlying perceptual base.

STIMULI TO NONALIGNMENT:
OVERALL INFLUENCES

The background conditions contributing to a nonaligned position are created as a composite stimulus including general environmental influences as well as more particular variables such as geographic position, strategic importance, national weakness or strength, and level of economic development.[3] Specific crises or events are also important as in the nature of interaction with major powers, especially prior to the achievement of independence. Two systemic stimuli are of particular significance in the development of Afro-Asian nonalign-

ment: the Cold War at the global level, and colonialism at the regional.

RESPONSE: BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS

The actual manifestation of nonalignment can be conceived as a response to these stimuli. Officially at least, nonalignment refers to nonparticipation in the general conflict system—no formal military ties with either East or West—and the adoption of a mediation role between conflicting Cold War parties. These requisites undoubtedly impose certain constraints on the behavior of nonaligned states not too dissimilar from those dictated by alignment. Theoretically nonalignment entails the judgment of issues on their own merit, but in reality this is often not the case, as was clearly evident in the 1956 Hungarian crisis. These nations have often been accused of "opportunism" and of "playing both sides against the mid-

[3] See references for a list of studies contributing to the development of this formulation.

dle." In a measure of self-defense the non-aligned declare that their policy is admirably suited to their general environmental and political conditions. Our purpose is neither to defend nor criticize this position but to examine empirically some of the perceptual processes mediating between various sources of nonalliance and the overt manifestation of this policy.

PROCESSES RELATING STIMULI
AND RESPONSES

It is stipulated that the perceptual process includes definition of the situation and the development of plans in reaction to perceived inputs from the environment. The nonaligned *definition of the situation* comprises perceptions of the international system and its key members, including the Cold War participants, issues and problems, historical and situational factors, and the like. More particularly we hypothesize that the policy of nonalignment is usually predicated on the following perceptions:

(1) The configuration of the *international system* is regarded as unfavorable and the essential bipolarization of the world into two antagonistic camps is perceived by the nonaligned as threatening to their own well-being.

(2) The *major powers* (the West and the Communists) are also perceived negatively and as threatening to other states in the system, especially to the Afro-Asian nations. The major powers' monopoly over the use of ultimate weapons is viewed as detrimental to international stability.

(3) The *Afro-Asian* states are regarded in favorable terms but as weak, especially in comparison with the major powers.

(4) Leading *nations in each of the Cold War alliances* are attributed higher levels of national capabilities than are specific nonaligned states like India, Egypt, or Indonesia.

(5) The *international position* of leading nations in each of the Cold War alliances is of greater concern to the nonaligned than are their respective domestic political orientations. In evaluating these states the nonaligned are less concerned with internal policies than with external behavior.

(6) Salient systemic *issues and problems* pertain primarily to the Afro-Asians, such as colonialism. Nuclear proliferation and disarmament are significant but viewed as secondary to more direct "third world" concerns. Issues central to the Cold War conflict—such as the relative merits of Communism and capitalism—are of markedly lesser importance.

(7) The *Cold War* and *systemic alliances* are salient to the nonaligned nations and regarded in highly unfavorable terms. Both are viewed as threatening to world peace and to nations that are not direct participants.

The nonaligned states formulate their respective *plans for action* on the basis of the foregoing definition of the world situation. We hypothesize that such plans include the following directives:

(1) The nonaligned states' perceived actions toward the *major powers* are based on assessments of major power behavior toward the "third world."

(2) If the actions of both the Communists and the West are viewed as similar, then *behavior toward* these are conceived accordingly.

(3) The *nonaligned states'* actions toward each other are viewed as essentially friendly.

(4) Behavior toward various *systemic alliances* is viewed as a function of the actions of these alignments.

(5) The *policy of nonalignment* is regarded as an active one and as favorably oriented toward all states in the international system.

On the whole, given the definition of the situation and the selection of alternative behaviors, this set of attitudes underlying nonalignment can be termed *neutralism*.[4] To summarize briefly, it is hypothesized that the most basic perceptions shared generally by the nonaligned states include (1) evaluation of both the West and the Communists in the same terms, (2) assessment of the actions of both groups toward the nonaligned also in similar terms, and (3) perceptions of nonaligned behavior toward both parties to the Cold War in similar terms. We do not suggest, however, that the nonaligned cannot differentiate meaningfully between the contending Cold War parties; rather we suggest that they do not express any partiality of sentiments toward either the West or the Communist states. Neither do we argue that these perceptions are sufficient or necessary for the development of nonalignment, but we say that they represent the most common attitudinal characteristics at the base of a nonaligned position.

Comments on Methodology

Recent studies in psychology have demonstrated that the most significant perceptual distinctions occur across three dimensions—evaluation, potency, and activity (Osgood *et al.*, 1957). Perceived objects are assessed as positive or negative, strong or weak, and active or passive. In tapping perceptions systematically, these may be said to differ in levels of intensity across a seven-point scale—from very positive (+3) to very negative (−3), with a point of perceptual neutrality (0) separating the two signs or directions of the scale. In this

study we infer perceptual orientation from speeches and addresses by major nonaligned leaders through the use of automated content analysis. This technique refers to systematic and objective methods of determining the characteristics of the written word through the use of computers for rapid data-processing (Stone *et al.*, 1966).[5]

The three Afro-Asian nations in question —India, Egypt, and Indonesia—were, and still are, key states in their respective areas, and their behavior inevitably affects the configuration of their regional systems. At the global level each has achieved a measure of renown for its official refusal to align in the Cold War conflict. These three were

---

[4] For the sake of clarity, "neutralism" refers to the above *perceptual* characteristics and "nonalignment" to the Afro-Asian official *policy* of nonbelligerence in the Cold War conflict.

[5] The method used here is a Stanford adaptation of the "General Inquirer" program developed at Harvard University (Stone *et al.*, 1962; Stone *et al.*, 1966). This system includes two *dictionaries* (a main dictionary consisting of over 3,000 words coded along the three dimensions of orientation—affect, potency, and activity—according to level of intensity, and a dictionary of proper names necessary for the identification of relevant actors), a system of *data preparation* based on the differentiation of sentences into themes (each theme composed of no more than one actor, action, and target), and specific *programs for retrieval* of the required information (Holsti, 1964a). In this study we used a *direct table* program designed to facilitate data analysis (Armour, 1964). This program yields two tables: the first includes the scores in summary form (frequency, intensity, and mode of expression denoted by a multiplier) along each dimension; the second presents the raw scores differentiated along the seven-point scale for each dimension, yet excludes the mode-of-expression multiplier. The summary indices described below are based on the output of the first table, and the analyses of variance are performed on the raw scores recorded in the second table.

The Stanford version of the "General Inquirer" system was originally written for IBM 7090 and is now being adapted to the 360 (for a detailed description of this system see Holsti, 1964).

among the earliest nations to adopt a non-aligned position and were instrumental in developing the rudimentary tenets of this policy. A very real question can be raised with respect to the validity of generalizing from these states' expressed orientation to the nonaligned group as a whole. However, at least during the period studied—mid-1950s to early 1960s—these states represented most forcefully the position of the "third world" in international politics.

In assessing the perceptual base of nonalignment we focus on key political leaders at the national level as primary units of analysis. The assumption here is that, to a very large extent, Jawaharlal Nehru, Ahmed Sukarno, and Gamal Abdel Nasser personally defined their states' position in world politics. It is further assumed that attitudes revealed through speeches, addresses, and the like are representative of an official national orientation. We examine major addresses delivered by these leaders before international Afro-Asian conferences and from these speeches we infer attitudinal orientation.[6]

_____

[6] The nature of the sample presents something of a problem in terms of the use of statistical tests. Strictly speaking, these major addresses have not been drawn at random. The population has been initially restricted, yet there is no reason to suspect that it is not normally distributed, neither is there any reason to suggest that these three sets of speeches are not independent. A very real problem, in terms of theoretical orientation and research procedures, could have arisen had we adhered strictly to more conventional practice and introduced randomness in our sampling procedure. References to issues other than those pertaining to international politics or foreign policy would have loaded our sample with nonrelevant data. The costs of coding and processing such information would have by far exceeded the benefits. Hence, it was deemed necessary to direct our sampling methods somewhat and focus on an international context within which external

It is generally agreed that the series of large scale Afro-Asian conferences held during the mid-1950s and early 1960s contributed significantly to the adoption of a nonaligned foreign policy (Jansen, 1966). These meetings were organized to supplement unofficial gatherings and laid the foundation for a common official position in world politics. Three of these conferences are of special significance. The Bogor meeting in 1954, that held at Bandung one year later, and the Belgrade conference in 1961 are commonly accepted as landmarks in the history of this region, marking the entry of Afro-Asia into the post-World War II international community. At these conferences Asian and African leaders delivered a series of addresses presenting their countries' orientation on world issues and problems. These speeches (approximately 50,000 words) have been systematically coded and processed, and constitute a primary source of data. Our intent is to develop an appropriate perceptual context by allowing these leaders to speak for themselves, to state

_____

behavior issues would be of primary interest. Basically, then, we argue that the use of parametric tests are justifiable given our theoretical concerns and the nature of the data. Yet in view of this unorthodox procedure the results of our statistical analysis should be interpreted with caution.

A more serious but related question is the impact of the audience of the content of communication. It could be argued that the leaders respond to the audiences at hand and that the content of perceptions may differ when expressed before different audiences. In examining this question empirically, we have found that the nonaligned leaders in question express the same orientation toward external affairs when addressing their respective domestic audiences as they do before international Afro-Asian gatherings. Differences in perceptions expressed before both types of audiences, national and international, are not statistically significant (Choucri, 1967).

their case as clearly as possible, and to support or reject many of the attitudes generally attributed to them.

Data Analysis: Perceptions Expressed at Afro-Asian Conferences

Our model suggests that the nonaligned states perceive the configuration of the international system as threatening to their existence, to their desire for recognition, and to their aspiration for better domestic conditions. As a result these states fear the external political environment and generally oppose prevailing cleavages and decisions. In this respect the variables of threat and fear may be instrumental in the development of nonalignment. The following hypotheses, derived from the nonalignment model, are designed to tap for some orientation toward the international system.[7]

Hypothesis 1: Nonaligned nations evaluate the international system in negative, strong, and active terms.

Hypothesis 2: Nonaligned nations evaluate the international system as threatening in general, and as threatening to them specifically.

These hypotheses are tested using essentially the same data, but by manipulating the indices to reflect appropriate dimensions. The first hypothesis refers to each dimension separately—affect, potency, activity; but the second seeks to infer one type of perceptual orientation—threat— from a composite of two dimensions—affect and

TABLE 2

PERCEPTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: SUMMARY INDICES*

Dimension	Index
Negative	.507
Strong	.775
Active	.703
Threat from system in general	.640
Threat from system to nonaligned states	.594
N** =	4217

* See explanation in text and footnote 9.
** Throughout this paper N refers to the number of observations in each category.

potency.[8] Because of the nature of the data and the construction of these hypotheses we cannot use a statistical test. However, the indices presented in Table 2 are indicative of an orientation toward the international system.[9]

The summary indices indicate that, contrary to expectations, the international system is *not* perceived as markedly negative: the affect index is not skewed significantly away from a positive orientation. These results suggest that the nonaligned states regard the community of nations in ambivalent rather than unfavorable terms. More significant, however, is the finding that the world is not perceived as unduly

---

[7] In this paper we depart from the conventional usage of the term hypothesis as denoting an "if *x*, then *y*" relations. Rather, we use "hypothesis" to refer to an expected relation between variables as stipulated by the model guiding this research. For our purposes we consider a hypothesis simply as "a conjectural statement of the relation between two or more variables" (Kerlinger, 1966, p. 20).

[8] $Threat = \dfrac{Negative\ Affect\ and\ Strength}{(Positive + Negative\ Affect) + (Strong + Weak)}$

(See Singer, 1958.)

[9] The summary indices are developed as a ratio; for example, negative affect index = NA/total affect. The range of these indices is from 0.0 to 1.0. Throughout this study the summary indices are used as indicators of perceptual orientation. Where possible we test for significance using the F test which takes into account the distribution of data along the seven-point scale for each dimension. Summary indices take into account the "mode of expression" which is numerically represented by a multiplier. The raw scores on which the analysis of variance is based do not.

threatening, although it is viewed as slightly more threatening in its general composition than specifically toward the nonaligned. And the indices refute hypothesis 2 as well as the affect stipulation in hypothesis 1. To extrapolate from the concept of threat to that of fear, it seems there is little fear recorded in the nonaligned nations' perceptions of the international system. This does not necessarily mean that they do not fear specific nations in it. The absence of generalized threat perceptions may or may not appear similarly absent in more specific orientations.

There are many conflicting interpretations in both academic and official circles as to how various groups in the international system are viewed by the nonaligned states. There is also considerable question as to whether historical contacts with the Western nations have affected present evaluation, and whether Communist policies in adjacent areas have had any significant impact on the "third world." The above model suggests that the nonaligned nations are basically impartial in their orientation toward the major powers.[10] It is argued that since the nonaligned have selected a nonbelliger-

<hr/>

[10] In this context impartiality refers essentially to the absence of expressed difference in perceptual orientation. This basic theoretical proposition underlies much of our analysis. Hence it should be noted that hypotheses 3, 4, 5, and 9 are, strictly speaking, null hypotheses in that a relation of no significant difference is stipulated. Accordingly, the decision to accept or reject these hypotheses refers basically to the null hypotheses. For the sake of convenience the expected relations are presented here in the form of hypotheses since these testable propositions are derived directly from our general model. Hypotheses 6 and 8, on the other hand, can be considered only as hypotheses, not as null hypotheses. To avoid confusion when interpreting the statistical results, the reader should refer directly to the explicit hypotheses in the text.

TABLE 3

PERCEPTIONS OF EAST AND WEST: SUMMARY INDICES

Dimension	West	East
Negative	.561	.540
Strong	.856	.846
Active	.907	.730
N =	495	210

Analysis of Variance
Findings (F Test), Hypothesis 3

Dimension	F ratio	Critical region*		Decision**
		.05	.01	
Affect	0.17	3.92	6.84	Accept
Potency	2.14	3.92	6.84	Accept
Activity	2.95	3.92	6.84	Accept

* Throughout this study values for the critical region are from "Table X: 95th and 99th Percentile Values of the F Distribution," in Walker and Lev, 1953, pp. 466–69.
** See footnote 9.

ent posture in the general conflict system, it is not unlikely that they evaluate both East and West in the same terms. This proposition is submitted to the empirical test:

Hypothesis 3: In their perceptions of the Cold War participants, the nonaligned nations evaluate East and West similarly with respect to affect, potency, and activity.[11]

These findings indicate that, despite the absence of a pronounced colonial background in Afro-Asia, the Communist nations are not viewed in significantly more favorable terms than the Western (Table 3). However, it may be misleading to consider results along the affect dimension as evi-

<hr/>

[11] Throughout this study the term "West" refers to members of the Western alliance system, including states participating in NATO, SEATO, ANZUS, and bilateral arrangements against the spread of Communism. The term "East" refers to states in the Communist alliance system and does not include non-Communist states located geographically in the eastern hemisphere.

dence of a marked disregard for the realities of Cold War politics or a lack of differentiation between East and West, for these may reflect calculated rather than direct attitudes. To maintain a degree of consistency between verbal pronouncement and official policy the nonaligned state could consciously avoid "leaning" to one side or the other. On the other hand, it is not unlikely that the data reveal uncalculated perceptions and that both East and West are, in fact, evaluated similarly along the affect dimension—and on potency as well. In this respect one nonaligned leader states:

International affairs are dominated today by the conflict between the western powers and the Communist powers, more particularly, by the rivalry between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. And, yet in spite of the manifest differences, there is an amazing similarity between the two Super-powers. . . . The real difference today is between the developed countries and those that are still underdeveloped [Nehru, 1959, p. 15].

The impressive achievements of the Soviet Union in the twentieth century do not seem to have overshadowed those of the United States, and admiration of the rapid progress of the Soviets does not necessarily include a desire to emulate the methods adopted by the Russians:

We see today capitalist countries which have achieved a very high material standard of living for their people. We also see a tremendous advance in material well-being and scientific and technological progress in the Soviet Union, achieved in a relatively short time . . . there has been a good deal of violence and purges associated with the development of the Soviet Union [Nehru, 1959, p. 13–14].

The data further suggest that the West is viewed as more active than the East. Although this finding is hardly unexpected, given the colonial history of Afro-Asia, it is not statistically significant. So far, at least, the issue of perceptual impartiality

seems to have empirical validity. Whether this is a reflection of calculated or of unmediated perceptions is a question which may be clarified somewhat by examining the nonaligned nations' perceptions of the *actions* of both East and West.

It is frequently argued in cognitive theory that the perceptual distinction between general evaluation of the other and perception of the other's actions is more than just a convenient artificial construct (Heider, 1958). While it is asserted that general evaluation is less subject to fluctuation and is more constant than are perceptions of action, it is also maintained that evaluation is contingent upon perceptions of behavior, that is, one's evaluation of the other is based upon perception of the other's actions toward oneself. Our model suggests that this latter position is more relevant in the Afro-Asian context, and that the nonaligned nations' assessment of various groups in the system is predicated on perceptions of their respective behavior.

Hypothesis 4: Nonaligned nations evaluate the Cold War antagonists in the same terms as they perceive the actions of the latter toward the nonaligned.

Our data indicate only limited similarity between the two types of perceptions (see Table 4). The nonaligned nations' affective orientation toward East and West does not seem to be predicated on perceptions of their activities. Along the affect dimension, at least, general evaluation is independent of action perceptions. But along the dimensions of potency and activity, perceptions of the Cold War participants are very much related to their general evaluation. Consequently, this hypothesis can be supported only in part. The relationship between evaluation and perceptions of action is still an open question. To clarify the issue somewhat, the nonaligned nations' percep-

TABLE 4

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MAJOR POWERS:
EVALUATION AND ACTION PERCEPTIONS
(SUMMARY INDICES)

Dimension	Evaluation	Action
Negative	.558	.901
Strong	.846	.947
Active	.841	.890
N =	705	144

Analysis of Variance
Findings (F Test), Hypothesis 4

| Dimension | F ratio | Critical region | | Decision* |
		.05	.01	
Affect	6.34	3.91	6.81	Reject at .05
Potency	0.53	3.91	6.81	Accept
Activity	0.42	3.94	6.90	Accept

* See footnote 9.

tions of the actions of East and West *separately* toward the "third world" are examined. The model stipulates that there is little perceptual differentiation in such assessment.

Hypothesis 5: Nonaligned nations perceive the actions of the Cold War antagonists toward the nonaligned in essentially the same terms.

The absence of sufficient data for perceptions of Communist actions has not made it possible to test this hypothesis statistically. At best the summary indices yield some indication of orientation. These record a negative affect index for the East's activities as 1.0, for the West as .89, .67, and .90 along potency dimensions and 0.0 and 1.0 along the activity dimension, respectively. On the basis of available data the hypothesis seems tenable for the affect dimension and possibility rejected in terms of potency and activity. In this respect, there is some evidence to suggest that Afro-Asian experiences with the Soviets and the Chinese— ranging from subtle diplomatic encounter to overt verbal confrontation—may indicate

awareness of a Communist parallel to Western penetration in Afro-Asia. This was evident as early as the Bandung conference in 1955, when one commentator referred to the position of a prominent Afro-Asian leader on the question of colonialism: ". . . he favored a clause on Colonialism which made reference to 'Colonialism of all types' because in our opinion, there is a sort of Colonialism on the Communist side and we thought it should be recognized" (*Mideast Mirror,* April 30, 1955).

Although these nonaligned nations expressed perceptions indicating similar orientations toward the major powers, it should be noted that in terms of *salience,* at least, certain differences arise. In this context, salience is defined in terms of frequency of expression. It is clear that the Afro-Asian states generally expressed greater concern over the actions of the West than those of the East, which may suggest that overt assessments of Communist actions are voiced with caution. Aside from the issue of salience, there is a marked absence of perceived distinctions between East and West.

The next question is the extent to which the nonaligned states distinguish themselves from other groups in world politics:

Hypothesis 6: Nonaligned nations do not evaluate the Afro-Asian states in the same terms as they evaluate the major powers. The former are viewed as more positive, less strong and less active.

The data lend only partial support to this hypothesis (see Table 5). It is certainly to be expected that the Afro-Asians are viewed more favorably than the major powers, yet perceived similarities in levels of potency and activity come as a surprise. Given the conference environment it is quite likely that these expressions are a function of enthusiastic oratory and that, in this instance, the potency and activity dimen-

TABLE 5

PERCEPTIONS OF AFRO-ASIAN NATIONS AND
THE MAJOR POWERS: SUMMARY INDICES

Dimension	Afro-Asia	Major powers
Negative	.279	.560
Strong	.871	.846
Active	.751	.830
N =	5305	705

Analysis of Variance
Findings (F Test), Hypothesis 6

| Dimension | F ratio | Critical region | | Decision* |
		.05	.01	
Affect	28.90	3.84	6.64	Accept
Potency	0.32	3.84	6.64	Reject
Activity	0.86	3.85	6.65	Reject

* See footnote 9.

sions are misleading indicators of orientation. On the other hand, these assessments could be interpreted as expressions of perceived diplomatic, rather than military, capability. One nonaligned leader stated: "I recognize that we cannot issue mandates. . . . I think we represent something important and valuable in the world and our voice counts to some extent" (Nehru, 1961, p. 113). And another declared: "Small nations are entitled and bound to play independently their constructive role in improving international relations and easing international tension" (Nasser, 1955, p. 4).

The term "nonalignment" is used with great frequency in the speeches delivered at the three conferences, while the word "neutralism" is rarely mentioned, and "neutrality" never appears. It may be that these nations do perceive a distinction between their own variant of nonalliance and that of states like Sweden and Switzerland.

. . . non-alignment is not neutrality, let there be no confusion on that score. Non-alignment is not the sanctimonious attitude of the man who holds himself aloft—"a plague on both your houses." Non-aligned policy is not a policy seeking for a neutral position in case of war. Non-aligned policy is not a policy of neutrality without its own colour: being non-aligned does not mean becoming a buffer state between the two giant blocs. Non-alignment is active devotion to the lofty cause of independence, abiding peace, social justice, and the freedom to be free [Kahin, 1956, p. 46].

Hypothesis 7: Nonaligned leaders perceive nonalignment in positive terms and regard it as a strong and active policy.

The summary indices yield .89 for positive effect, .91 for strength and .79 for activity. These results are not unexpected and support the hypothesis.

At this point we inquire whether these nonaligned states perceive the Afro-Asian nations allied either to East or West differently from those that are uncommitted. The model suggests that, to the nonaligned, foreign policy position is a more important criterion of assessment than in domestic politics. In this respect, international orientation could very well overshadow memories of shared historical experiences, level of economic development, and common national attributes.

Hypothesis 8: Nonaligned nations do not evaluate the nonaligned group of Afro-Asian states in the same terms as they evaluate those that are aligned either to East or West.

Surprisingly enough, the nonaligned leaders do not seem to differentiate between the allied and nonaligned states of Asia and Africa: both are viewed favorably regardless of foreign policy orientation (see Table 6). This similarity is also evident along the activity dimension, where aligned and nonaligned are perceived as equally active. But differences arise, along the potency dimension, and the group of aligned states are regarded as stronger than the non-

TABLE 6

PERCEPTION OF ALIGNED AND NONALIGNED
AFRO-ASIAN NATIONS: SUMMARY INDICES

Dimension	Aligned	Nonaligned
Negative	.272	.275
Strong	.931	.897
Active	.678	.747
N =	219	5086

Analysis of Variance
Findings (F Test), Hypothesis 8

Dimension	F ratio	Critical region		Decision*
		.05	.01	
Affect	0.23	3.85	6.66	Reject
Potency	12.29	3.85	6.66	Accept
Activity	1.38	3.85	6.66	Reject

* See footnote 9.

allied.[12] India's dispute with Pakistan, primarily over Kashmir, was certainly aggravated by the realization that SEATO provides Pakistan with needed arms and assistance. And Egypt, acutely conscious of Israel's military capabilities on the one hand, and of Western support for certain Arab regimes on the other, contributed to an assessment of the aligned faction as highly potent. It is possible, however, that these perceptions were intentionally expressed to promote unity among various factions of the "third world."

Variations in Perceptual Orientation: India, Egypt, Indonesia

At this point the three countries' perceptions are compared to determine the extent to which individual attitudes reflect common orientations. Although some differences in perceptions are to be expected, for each nation's policy is based on individual as well as shared motivations, we would sug-

gest that such differences, if any, are not significant.

Hypothesis 9: Nonaligned nations do not differ in their perceptions of the international system, East and West, the nonaligned group, or international alignments.[13]

The analysis of combined perceptions indicated that a nonaligned policy is not predicated on perceptions of threat from, or fear of, the international system, although there is some evidence for feelings of ambivalence. These findings are still valid, though to a lesser extent, when separating the three nations' perceptions. Variations in perceptual orientation are presented in Table 7 along with a measure of statistical significance. Individual summary indices are, on the whole, consistent with combined indices in Table 2, but variations along the affect and activity dimensions are significant. Generally, all three leaders focused on the issue of systemic change, each expressing a different assessment of international developments.

The Indian leader focused primarily on the general question of change. "We live in strange and stirring times, when the face of this ancient continent of Asia is changing . . . but these are times of trial and testing for us" (*The Bogor Conference*, 1954, p. 39). President Sukarno interpreted change in the international system primarily in terms of the conflict between states of Asia and Africa and the more established countries of Europe and America:

Prevailing world opinion would have us believe that the real source of international tensions and strife is ideological conflict between the great powers. I think this is not true, there is a conflict which cuts deeper into the flesh of man . . . and that is the conflict be-

---

[12] The Afro-Asian states aligned to the West are significantly more salient than those aligned to the East. This is primarily a function of the fact that they are by far more numerous.

[13] Although the nonaligned nations' perceptions of international alliances have not been presented earlier, we include them at this point since they may be of some interest to the reader.

TABLE 7

PERCEPTIONS OF INDIA, EGYPT, INDONESIA

Dimension	International system			West			East			Nonaligned			Alignments		
	India	Egypt	Indon.	India	Egypt	Indon.	India	Egypt	Indon.	India	Egypt	Indon.	India	Egypt	Indon.
Negative	.634	.400	.538	.523	.715	.285	.562	.523	0.0	.367	.290	.259	.323	.207	.015
Strong	.788	.783	.761	.680	.892	.950	.702	.680	1.0	.748	.927	.918	.745	.910	.975
Active	.678	.604	.779	.758	.958	.944	.666	.758	0.77	.719	.720	.790	.812	.820	.678
N =	543	1537	2137	143	253	99	94	29	87	1191	1718	2177	138	196	136

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NEHRU, NASSER, SUKARNO
Analysis of Variance
Findings (F Test), Hypothesis 9

Dimension	International System				Afro-Asian nonaligned				Alignments			
	F ratio	Critical region		Decision*	F ratio	Critical region		Decision*	F ratio	Critical region		Decision*
		.05	.01			.05	.01			.05	.01	
Affect	4.72	4.62	3.00	Reject	1.53	4.62	3.00	Accept	7.47	4.71	3.04	Reject
Potency	0.91	4.62	3.00	Accept	0.29	4.62	3.00	Accept	0.91	4.92	3.18	Accept
Activity	14.60	4.66	3.02	Reject	0.75	4.62	3.00	Accept	1.00	4.95	3.14	Accept

DIFFERENCES IN EACH LEADER'S PERCEPTIONS OF EAST AND WEST**

Leader	Dimension	F ratio	Critical region		Decision*
			.01	.05	
Nehru	Affect	1.79	6.70	3.86	Accept
	Potency	0.93	7.39	4.11	Accept
	Activity	0.004	7.77	4.27	Accept
Sukarno	Affect	0.01	7.24	4.04	Accept
	Potency	3.52	7.31	4.08	Accept
	Activity	Data insufficient			

* See footnote 9.
** Nasser's scores for East are too scanty to allow statistical test.

tween the new emergent forces of freedom and justice and the older forces of domination . . . [Soekarno, 1961, p. 27–28].

In contrast, Gamel Abdel Nasser's expressed interests centered primarily around regional issues.

The three leaders differed only minimally in their assessment of the major powers. The greatest variations occur along the affect dimension, but these are not significant. In general Nehru expressed the least perceptual distinction between East and West, viewing both with the same affective neutrality. Sukarno, on his part,

assessed the major powers in equally favorable terms. In contrast, Nasser seemed to draw considerable distinctions between the West and the Communists and perceived the former in more salient and more negative terms.

The model stipulates that the nonaligned nations' definition of the situation includes negative perceptions of alliance systems. However, this hypothesis is not borne out by the data. Neither India, Egypt, nor Indonesia seem to evaluate existing alliance structures negatively.

Despite quantitative evidence, these re-

sults are not convincing. Time and again the nonaligned leaders publicly declare their disapproval of formal alliances and reject any suggestion that they themselves form a separate alliance. Gamal Abdel Nasser stated: "We do not constitute a bloc. We are against blocs and alliances" (Nasser, 1961, p. 160). On the other hand, the nonaligned leaders are known to make statements conceding the need for major power alliances. Nehru declared in 1955: "I can understand, although I would not approve, military alliances between great Powers" (Nehru, 1958, p. 281). This seemingly ambivalent attitude toward alliance systems may stem from the fact that all three nations, while being nonaligned in the global conflict, do participate in their own regional defense systems. These states seem to reason that global alliances are conducive to systemic tensions, whereas regional ones —in which major powers do not participate —are necessary for "peace and security." Unfortunately our data are not coded for separate indices of regional and global alliances; hence this argument is purely inferential.

In addition to some consensus on perceptions of the Afro-Asian group, there seems to be a general agreement on policy position. All three states appear to view the role of the nonaligned group in world politics primarily as one of mediation rather than of overt participation in the global conflict. Nasser expressed the nonaligned position as follows:

I believe . . . we all agree that there should not be in the method of our approach in the resolutions we reach or in the effects it may leave on world public opinion, that which might insinuate directly or indirectly that the states following a policy of nonalignment are by their activities creating a third world bloc. We live in a world suffering from the strife between two blocs and we cannot imagine that a third bloc should enter the arena and increase the tension of this strife instead of easing it" [Nasser, 1961a, p. 45].

Elaborating further on the policy of nonalignment, Sukarno stated:

Nonalignment is not directed against any one country or against any one bloc or against any particular type of social system. It is our common conviction that a policy of nonalignment is the best for each of us to a positive contribution toward the preservation of peace and the relaxation of international tensions [Soekarno, 1961, p. 26].

On the whole, there do not seem to be any significant variations in the three leaders' expressed perceptions. From a cursory reading of these speeches differences in political style are evident. Nehru's caution, Sukarno's flamboyance, and Nasser's forthrightness colored their individual expressions. But personal idiosyncracies do not seem to indicate significant variations in perceptions.

Conclusion: The Perceptual Base of Nonalignment

This study has sought to identify some of the attitudes underlying a nonaligned policy. Toward this end a series of major diplomatic speeches were collected, coded, and analyzed, and a set of hypotheses designed to identify the nonaligned states' perceptions of the international system and various groups in it were then submitted to empirical test. The results confirmed several of our propositions and rejected others.[14] At this point some of the basic perceptions underlying "third world" policy are presented.[15]

---

[14] In assessing these results the caveats noted in footnote 6 should not be overlooked.

[15] This study examined only selected hypotheses at the core of the nonalignment model. Data on perceptions of Cold War, specific nations, and world problems are not presented here.

TABLE 8

RAW SCORES DIFFERENTIATED ALONG THE SEVEN-POINT SCALE. CONFERENCE SPEECHES: COMBINED SCORES FOR THREE LEADERS

Dimension	International system	West	East	Major powers	Action: major powers	Afro-Asians	Nonaligned	Aligned
Affect								
Pos. 3	109	13	5	18	0	258	240	18
2	147	16	8	24	1	266	236	3
1	124	14	5	17	2	120	119	1
Neg. −1	107	21	5	26	2	106	103	3
−2	98	8	3	11	2	90	88	2
−3	163	23	8	31	8	100	95	5
Potency								
Stg. 3	176	26	2	29	7	256	251	5
2	225	30	26	56	6	271	255	16
1	212	16	15	31	4	239	235	4
Weak −1	56	0	6	6	0	25	22	3
−2	78	6	2	8	1	83	72	11
−3	49	3	0	3	0	22	21	1
Activity								
Act. 3	109	12	4	16	4	155	152	3
2	171	21	11	32	6	226	211	15
1	90	14	12	26	9	256	247	9
Pas. −1	20	4	2	6	2	78	77	1
−2	58	1	1	2	2	74	73	1
−3	58	1	3	4	0	35	35	0

TABLE 9

CONFERENCE SPEECHES: DIFFERENTIATED SCORES ACCORDING TO LEADER

Dimension	International system			East*		West		
	Nehru	Nasser	Sukarno	Nehru	Sukarno	Nehru	Nasser	Sukarno
Affect								
Pos. 3	14	40	55	3	2	7	3	3
2	19	74	58	0	8	5	5	6
1	14	47	63	1	4	1	4	9
Neg. −1	35	26	46	5	1	0	16	5
−2	22	31	45	1	2	2	4	2
−3	31	40	92	6	2	10	12	1
Potency								
Stg. 3	38	61	77	2	0	9	12	5
2	28	100	97	4	7	6	16	8
1	43	75	94	7	4	1	8	7
Weak −1	12	16	28	2	4	0	0	0
−2	10	27	41	2	0	3	2	1
−3	11	20	18	0	0	1	2	0
Activity								
Act. 3	13	32	64	1	3	3	8	1
2	22	71	78	6	4	2	17	2
1	14	27	49	6	1	1	8	5
Pas. −1	4	7	9	2	0	2	1	1
−2	9	31	18	0	0	0	1	0
−3	7	26	26	1	2	1	0	0

* Few scores are recorded for Nasser's perceptions of the East.

(1) The nonaligned states do not view the *international system* in negative terms, nor do they regard it as threatening in general or as threatening to themselves specifically.

(2) The *Cold War participants* are generally perceived in similar terms. Discrepancies that do occur appear along the activity dimension.

(3) The *Afro-Asian nations* as a whole are regarded more favorably than the major powers, and aside from perceptions of strength, all Afro-Asian states are assessed in the same terms despite differences in foreign policy commitments.

(4) The three groups in question—East, West, and nonaligned—are attributed equal *capabilities*. (However, this may result from calculated verbal expressions.)

(5) Generally, *perceptions of actions* seem to be related to overall evaluation. But assessments of the major powers along the affect dimension appear unrelated to their perceived behavior.

(6) In general the actions of the major powers are viewed in clearly negative terms. Evaluation of great power capability is congruent with their perceived behavior.

(7) Afro-Asian *nonalignment* is viewed in positive terms and as a strong and active policy.

(8) *International alignments* are not assessed in negative terms.

(9) On the whole the most discriminating perceptual distinctions are made along the *affect* dimension.

These perceptual orientations seem to pertain when examining each nonaligned state separately. The degree of variation among Indian, Egyptian, and Indonesian attitudes—as expressed before Afro-Asian audiences—are not significant. There seems to be general agreement on the role of the nonaligned states in world politics. Positive

assessments of the Afro-Asian group appear to be a more significant component of the perceptual base of nonalignment than are negative evaluations of the major powers. This identification is undoubtedly an important variable in the formulation of the role of nonaligned states in the international system. Indeed, the evidence so far reflects congruence between the official nonaligned position and expressed attitudinal orientation. We do not argue, however, that *actual behavior* is consistent with official policy. This is an empirical question largely beyond the scope of this article.[16]

---

[16] A preliminary attempt to clarify empirically the relation between *perceptions* and *behavior* indicated some fundamental differences among India, Egypt, and Indonesia in terms of behavior toward East and West (see Choucri, 1968, for description and analysis of action data).

REFERENCES

ARMOUR, ANNE. "A Balgol Program for Quantitative Format in Automated Content Analysis." Stanford University, unpublished manuscript, 1964.

BERKES, ROSS N., and MOHINDER S. BEDI. *The Diplomacy of India.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958.

BOULDING, KENNETH E. *The Image.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1957.

BRECHER, MICHAEL. *The New States of Asia: Political Analysis.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1966.

BURTON, J. W. *International Relations: A General Theory.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966.

CHOUCRI, NAZLI. "The Nonalignment of Afro-Asian States: Policy, Perceptions, and Behavior." Unpublished paper delivered at the Canadian Political Science Association Meeting, Calgary, June 1968.

———. "The Perceptual Base of Nonalignment." Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1967.

FIELD, JOHN OSGOOD, and NAZLI CHOUCRI. "Action and Perception in the Sino-Indian Border Conflict." Stanford University, unpublished manuscript, 1968.

HEIDER, FRITZ. *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations.* New York: Wiley, 1958.

HOLSTI, OLE R. "An Adaptation of the 'General Inquirer' for the Systematic Analysis of Political Documents," *Behavioral Science,* 9 (1964), 382–88.

———. "Computer Content Analysis As a Tool in International Relations Research." Stanford University, mimeo, 1964a.

———, et al. "Theory and Measurement of Interstate Behavior: A Research Application of Automated Content Analysis." Stanford Studies in International Conflict and Integration, unpublished manuscript, 1964.

JANSEN, G. H. *Nonalignment and the Afro-Asian States.* New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.

JERVIS, ROBERT. "The Cost of the Scientific Study of Politics: An Examination of the Stanford Content Analysis Studies," *International Studies Quarterly,* 11 (1967), 366–93.

KAHIN, GEORGE McTURNAN. *The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, 1955.* New York: Cornell University Press, 1956.

KERLINGER, FRED. *Foundations of Behavioral Research: Educational and Psychological Inquiry.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966.

KRECH, DAVID, and RICHARD S. CRUTCHFIELD. "Perceiving the World." In Wilber Schramm (ed.), *The Process and Effects of Mass Communication.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965.

LISKA, GEORGE. *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962.

LYON, PETER. *Neutralism.* Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1963.

MARTIN, LAWRENCE W. (ed.). *Neutralism and Nonalignment: The New States in World Affairs.* New York: Praeger, 1962.

MILLER, GEORGE A., et al. *Plans and the Structure of Behavior.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960.

NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL. "Address by President Nasser at Bandung, 1955." Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, Hoover Library, mimeo, p. 4.

———. "The Speech Delivered by Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the United Arab Republic." In *The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries.* Beograd, Yugoslavia, 1961.

———. *Speeches and Press Interviews, January–December, 1961,* Information Department, UAR, 1961a.

NEHRU, JAWAHARLAL. *India Today and Tomorrow.* New Delhi: Indian Council for Cultural Relations, 1959.

———. *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches,* vol. 3, March 1953–August 1957. Government of India: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1958.

———. "Speech Delivered by Prime Minister Nehru before the Political Committee of the Asian-African Conference, April 22, 1955." In G. McT. Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, 1955.* New York: Cornell University Press, 1956.

———. "The Speech Delivered by Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India." In *The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries.* Beograd, Yugoslavia, 1961.

NORTH, ROBERT C. "Research Pluralism and the International Elephant," *International Studies Quarterly,* 11 (1967), 394–416.

OSGOOD, CHARLES E., et al. *The Measurement of Meaning.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957.

ROSSI, MARIO. *The Third World: The Unaligned Countries and the World Revolution.* New York: Funk and Wagnall, 1963.

SINGER, DAVID J. "Threat Perception and the Armament Tensions Dilemma," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2, 1 (March 1958), 90–105.

SOEKARNO, AHMED. "Speech Delivered by Dr. Ahmed Soekarno, President of the Republic of Indonesia." In *The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries.* Beograd, Yugoslavia, 1961.

STONE, PHILIP J., et al. "The General Inquirer: A Computer System for Content Analysis and Retrieval Based on the Sentence as a Unit of Information," *Behavioral Science,* 7 (1962), 484–94.

———, et al. *The General Inquirer: A Computer Approach to Content Analysis.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966.

The Bogor Conference. Republic of Indonesia: Ministry of Information, 1954.

WALKER, HELEN M., and JOSEPH LEV. *Statistical Inference.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1953.

ZANINOVICH, GEORGE MARTIN. "An Empirical Theory of State Response: The Sino-Soviet Case." Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1964.

ZINNES, DINA A. "The Expression and Perception of Hostility in Prewar Crises: 1914." In: J. David Singer (ed.), *Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence.* New York: Free Press, 1968.