

The Nonalignment of Afro-Asian States: Policy, Perception, and Behaviour

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The purpose of this paper* is to examine the orientation of three Afro-Asian states in world politics during the mid 1950s and early 1960s—an important period in the development of their current international posture—with primary emphasis on the relationship between official policy, attitudes of the national leaderships, and actual behaviour. Nations do not always behave in accordance with stated policies, nor are their actions necessarily congruent with dominant attitudes. The degree of consistency between these three aspects of national orientation is the question to which this enquiry is addressed. The states examined—India, Egypt, and Indonesia—were selected not because they represent Afro-Asia as a whole, but because they expressed in the most forceful terms the position of the “third world” during this period.

Introduction

A certain ambiguity surrounds the position of Afro-Asian states in international politics. The terms “neutralism” and “nonalignment” have been used most frequently to describe their orientation. Yet these terms carry a multiplicity of connotations. Some scholars have used them interchangeably on the assumption that they do not differ in meaning; others have preferred the term “neutral” when referring to the policy of non-participation in the cold war pursued by so many Asian and African states; still others have regarded the position of such states as predicated solely on self-interest and consider their policies mainly in terms of “coalition formation.” Afro-Asian behaviour has been regarded as pure opportunism in a world divided by two conflicting blocs: states are alleged to join either the Communists or the West on an *ad hoc* basis for the purpose of attaining immediate goals and, upon achieving their objectives, to revert to a “middle position.” Consequently, they are regarded as a “floating influence” in the international system to be allocated to East or West, or withheld from both, as the case may be. Contributing further to current ambiguity, some analysts talk of “positive” and “negative” neutralism, of “messianic,” “ideological,” and “pragmatic” neutralism. Thus, while some define Afro-Asian policy in terms of the cold war, others do so in terms of rational policy calculations, and still others in

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terms of attitudinal variables, among which the various connotations of the terms are seldom clearly distinguished.

In an attempt to shed light on various aspects of Afro-Asian orientation in international politics we formulate the issue in terms that can be examined empirically by distinguishing between official policy, dominant attitudes, and overt behaviour.¹ For the purpose of this paper *policy* refers to a state's formal position in the international system²; in contrast, *overt behaviour* refers to general patterns of interaction with other states ranging from co-operation to conflict; and *attitudinal orientation* refers to the perceptual assessments that national leaders bring to bear upon their general environment. Our initial concern is with official posture.

Many of the Afro-Asian states have chosen not to undertake any formal alliances in the cold war and have as a result been called "nonaligned." Despite a common international posture, these states display varying degrees of involvement in the war and differ markedly in their dependence upon and relationship to the major powers.³ The three states examined have achieved a measure of renown for their refusal to join the Communist or the Western alliances in spite of their involvement in cold war disputes. They were among the earliest nations to adopt a nonaligned position and thus helped develop the rudimentary tenets of this policy. The *policy* of these states can be described as a high involvement in the cold war without any direct commitment to either of the belligerents. Their actual *behaviour*—in crises as well as non-crises—may or may not be congruent with over-all policy orientation. States generally declare that their actions are consonant with and predicated upon official policy; yet such consistency is not always shown. In the last analysis, nations respond less to objective factors than to their own *perceptualization* of the external environment. The degree of congruence between official policy, attitudinal orientation, and overt behaviour can best be established by systematic methods of analysis.

A methodological note

At this point our enquiry is formulated in terms that can be examined empirically. The parameters of the problem include (1) the *contents* of policy, perceptions, and behaviour; (2) the *relationship* between policy perceptions, and behaviour; and (3) the degree of *variation* among nonaligned states in terms of perceptions and behaviour.

Nonalignment has been defined as non-commitment in the general conflict system. We now suggest that perceptual orientation as well as behaviour are consistent with official policy. More specifically, we hypothesize that such congruence would include the following directives:

¹This paper focuses on the early period in the development of nonalignment and not on current expressions of the policy; consequently, any generalizations from the findings of this to current conditions should be undertaken with considerable caution.

²We are aware that the term "policy" is used here in a more limited sense than is general in the literature.

³The relationship of the nonaligned nations to the cold war ranges from low involvement, exemplified by Chad, Gabon, and Niger, to moderate involvement, as seen in the positions of Morocco, Sudan, and Ceylon, to high involvement, indicated by most of the other Afro-Asian states.

Le nonalignement des états afro-asiatiques

Examen de l'orientation politique internationale de trois Etats afro-asiatiques au milieu des années 1950 et au début des années 1960—période importante dans l'établissement de leur position internationale d'aujourd'hui—avec une insistance particulière sur l'interaction entre la politique officielle, les attitudes des leaders nationaux et les comportements politiques au jour le jour. Les Etats qui font l'objet de l'étude sont l'Inde, l'Egypte et l'Indonésie. Elle s'applique (1) à clarifier le contenu de la politique, ses perceptions et le comportement effectif, (2) à établir les rapports entre ces trois dimensions d'une direction nationale en politique étrangère, et (3) à préciser le degré de variation des perceptions et du comportement d'un Etat à l'autre. Le contenu de la politique se détermine par une analyse qualitative des déclarations officielles; on saisit les perceptions par une analyse automatisée de contenu des discours que prononcèrent Nehru, Nasser et Soukarno lors de conférences afro-asiatiques spécialement importantes; le comportement se dégage d'une analyse quantitative des relations avec les grandes puissances. Les résultats montrent que les trois pays non-alignés ne manifestent aucune partialité envers le monde libre ou les pays communistes, ni qu'ils aient une orientation favorable à l'égard de l'Est ou de l'Ouest. A l'examen des politiques communes des trois pays à l'égard des grandes puissances on aboutit aux mêmes conclusions. Toutefois, l'Inde et l'Indonésie font montre d'une meilleure coopération avec l'Ouest que l'Egypte dont l'activité politique s'affronte davantage à celle de l'Ouest qu'à celle de l'Est. Ces résultats n'entament pas nécessairement la nature du nonalignement afro-asiatique mais signalent l'importance d'une réévaluation du rôle de cette politique dans le système international d'aujourd'hui.

First, with respect to perceptual orientation,

- (1) the nonaligned states evaluate the West and the Communists in the same terms;
- (2) the nonaligned states perceive the actions of both groups also in similar terms.

Second, with respect to overt behaviour,

- (3) the nonaligned states' actions toward East and West do not differ significantly⁴;
- (4) the nonaligned states' actions toward East and West do not display differing levels of co-operation.

Third, with respect to the relationship between policy, perceptions, and actions,

- (5) the actions of nonaligned states are congruent with their attitudes.
- (6) overt behaviour and perceptual assessments are not incongruent with official policy.

Essentially, then, we postulate a certain impartiality toward East and West in terms of attitudes and behaviour, and we argue that this impartiality is consistent with an official policy of non-commitment in the general conflict system.⁵ In examining these hypotheses, we attempt to bring various systematic methods of analysis to bear upon a "real world" issue.

⁴Throughout this study the term "West" refers to the major power members of the Western alliance system. The term "East" refers to major powers in the Communist alliance system and does not include non-Communist states located geographically in the eastern hemisphere.

⁵This is basically a working or tentative hypothesis. The results should shed light on the general issue regardless of the particular outcome.

Our point of departure is official *policy*. On the basis of intensive planning at Bogor in 1954, twenty-five states attended the first large-scale Afro-Asian conference at Bandung one year later. This meeting was designed primarily to increase interaction and promote co-operation among the newly independent states of Asia and Africa. Throughout the following years, Afro-Asian national leaders convened periodically in an attempt to agree upon a common role in world politics. The most important of these conferences was held at Belgrade in 1961, where a policy of nonalignment was explicitly formulated. The final communiqué included a definite statement of Afro-Asian involvement in contemporary world problems, along with a pledge not to participate directly in the cold war. From a qualitative analysis of the final communiqués issued at these conferences we infer a policy position. Our intent is to clarify various aspects of this policy by examining its formulation at the three conferences that contributed most directly to the development of nonalignment.

A related question is the degree to which the perceptual orientations of nonaligned states are consistent with statements of official policy. We infer *perceptual orientation* from a quantitative analysis of the speeches and addresses delivered at these conferences by leaders of the non-aligned nations in question—India, Egypt, and Indonesia—on the assumption that perceptions expressed formally are representative of an official national orientation. A very real question can be raised with respect to the validity of generalizing from these states' expressed perceptual orientation to the nonaligned group as a whole. However, from the mid 1950s to early 1960s these states did present a forceful statement of the third world's position in international politics.

An evaluation of the *behaviour* of these states is undertaken by examining their discrete actions vis-à-vis the major powers. To this end, the actions of Egypt, Indonesia, and India during the period 1954–62 have been collected and analysed according to their implications for conflict or co-operation. Our intent is to determine as objectively as possible the intensity of orientation towards the major powers along a conflict-co-operation dimension. This method is described below.

It is obviously difficult to compare policy, perceptions, and behaviour in any precise and quantitative fashion, but it is our contention that each can be assessed as objectively as possible, and, on that basis, the degree of congruence or consistency between them can be determined. It is at this point that the writer's own judgment comes into play. To place quantitative findings in a proper perspective it is often necessary to interject qualitative assessments.

Official policy

How do the nonaligned states themselves conceive of their official position in the international system? The speeches delivered at the Bogor, Bandung, and Belgrade conferences reveal to some extent their individual orientations, and a joint statement of policy first enunciated at Bandung in 1955, and clearly presented in the final declaration of the Belgrade conference in 1961, reveals a variety of notions subsumed under the rubric of nonalignment. In this section we shall try to articulate in qualitative terms some of the considerations voiced by the states in question.

The most significant by-product of these conferences—as evidenced in their final policy statements—was a realization that isolation from the rest of the world was no longer possible, and this realization led to discussions of the Afro-Asian position in the international system. The tone and general orientation of the Bogor and Bandung communiqués differed considerably. The former focused primarily on co-operation among the Asian and African states and the organization of the forthcoming conference, whereas the Bandung communiqué covered a whole range of issues primarily of a regional nature; both documents were remarkably void of any direct reference to the major powers, although opposition to the cold war in general was asserted. Almost all issues covered in these communiqués, such as colonialism and economic development, had a direct bearing on regional affairs.⁶ In contrast, the final communiqué of the Belgrade conference focused directly on international issues. The cold war, recognition of Communist China, peaceful coexistence, the use of nuclear weapons, all featured prominently. The third world was now expressing its own views on various international issues. A clear shift from a local to a broader orientation had taken place. By 1961 the nonaligned states had defined their own *identity* as one based on ancient civilizations and redefined to cope with challenges of modern life. They defined their international *role* as one of mediation between conflicting parties in world politics. And they defined their international *function* as one of reducing systematic tensions and stabilizing interaction processes at the global level. These notions were formulated initially within the larger Afro-Asian context and restated in 1961 specifically within a nonaligned framework. During the years that separated Bandung and Belgrade there was general agreement that

We are not . . . neutral. . . . We want it understood that we do not welcome this appellation of being called neutral or neutralist whatever it means. We are not neutral in regard to domination by imperialism and other countries. We are not neutral with regard to the greatest economic and social problems that may arise . . . our position is that we are . . . unaligned and uncommitted . . . in relation to the cold war. . . . We do not belong to one camp or another.⁷

By 1961 the basic tenet of nonalignment had crystallized—no military or political alliance with major powers—and the role of the third world was now conceived as an active one in the international system, clearly replacing a passive acceptance of major power decisions and actions. The final communiqué of the Belgrade conference declared that “The participants of the Conference consider it essential that the non-aligned countries should participate in solving outstanding international issues concerning peace and security in the world as none of them can remain unaffected by or indifferent to these issues.”⁸

It is interesting to note that the term “nonalignment” was used with great frequency in the speeches presented at these conferences, while the word “neutralist” was barely mentioned and “neutrality” appeared only once or twice. This

⁶The final communiqué of the Bandung Conference includes the famous “Ten Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.” Briefly these comprise the following directives: respect for human rights and the Charter of the United Nations, for sovereignty and territorial integrity, for the right of each nation to defend itself, for justice and international obligation; recognition of the equality of all races and nations; abstention from the use of arrangements organized by the major powers; refraining from acts of aggression; settlement of international disputes by peaceful means; and promotion of mutual interests and obligations.

⁷United Nations, *General Assembly Official Records 1960*, 444–6.

⁸“The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries,” 1961, 256.

may indicate that these nations perceive a distinction between their own variant of non-alliance and that of other states in the international system. One leader stated:

. . . non-alignment is not neutrality, let there be no confusion on that score. Non-alignment is not the sanctimonious attitude of the man who holds himself aloof—"a plague on both your houses." Non-aligned policy is not a policy of seeking for a neutral position in the case of war. Non-aligned policy is not a policy of neutrality without its own colour; being non-aligned does not mean becoming a buffer state between the two giant blocs. Non-alignment is active devotion to the lofty cause of justice and the freedom to be free. It is the determination to serve this cause; it runs congruent with the social consciousness of man.⁹

Clearly the theme of independence in the international system is dominant in the *melée* of nonalignment. Perhaps another significant ingredient in this policy—distinguishing it from the position of either of the major powers—is the absence of an "official enemy" in the global content. Thus, while the Free world proclaims Communism as the target of its "defensive" alliances, and the Eastern bloc sees the West as an antagonistic civilization, the Afro-Asians as a group do not define their "enemy" in terms of a nation or set of nations, but more in terms of a series of systemic processes, such as colonialism, "neo-colonialism," and the like. In the words of an Afro-Asian decision-maker: "Non-alignment is not directed against any one country or against any one bloc or against any particular type of social system. It is our common conviction that a policy of non-alignment is the best for each of us to make a positive contribution toward the preservation of peace and the relaxation of international tensions."¹⁰ It should be noted that although many of the Afro-Asian states—including India, Egypt, and Indonesia—do define their "enemy" in national terms, yet nonalignment as a policy is generally considered relevant only at the global level, and no attempt is made, for obvious reasons, to reduce it to regional proportions.¹¹

These, then, seem to be some of the more general "ingredients" of Afro-Asian policy orientation as expressed by their leaders during the period considered here. An interesting question is the extent to which perceptions and attitudes of individual nonaligned states, as expressed by their leaders, are consistent with an official policy of non-alliance. At this point, qualitative methods of analysis are replaced by more quantitative techniques.

Perceptual orientation

The adoption of nonalignment by many of the Afro-Asian countries suggests the existence of common attitudinal characteristics uniting them in their non-commitment to either of the major power blocs. This, however, is an empirical question. States may be nonaligned for similar or for different reasons. Variations in perceptions may account for similarities in behaviour. The key issues here involve the contents of relevant attitudes and the relationship between attitudes

⁹*Ibid.*, 27.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 26.

¹¹The Sino-Indian conflict in 1962 illustrates the relevance (or irrelevance—depending on one's viewpoint) of the nonalignment policy. India could enlist the assistance of the Western powers without formally joining their alliance system.

and overt behaviour. In this section we seek to identify quantitatively some of the more general perceptions at the base of a nonaligned policy. More specifically, we attempt to determine as objectively as possible how the nonaligned nations in question perceive the cold war antagonists.

Perceptions are inferred from a content analysis¹² of speeches delivered by Jawaharlal Nehru, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Ahmed Sukarno at the three Afro-Asian conferences referred to earlier: the Bogor meeting in 1954, the Bandung conference of 1955, and the Belgrade conference of 1961.¹³ These speeches (approximately 50,000 words) have been systematically coded and processed to yield an appropriate reflection of attitudes along the three most significant dimensions of perceptual orientation: affect, potency, and activity. Such evaluations, usually made in terms of good or bad, strong or weak, and active or passive, are considered as the most basic vehicles of cognition. A convenient method of determining how objects, individuals, states, problems, and the like are perceived is by calculating the ratio of expressed positive to negative affect, strength to weakness, and activity to passivity, thereby yielding quantitative indicators of orientation along these three dimensions. This method, then, is designed to provide empirical indication of attitudes, on the assumption that the latter are as amenable to objective and systematic analysis as is overt behaviour.

The hypotheses examined in this section are designed primarily to "tap" for the nonaligned nations' perceptions of the major powers and test for the degree of similarity in orientation toward East and West. Our first hypotheses are:

- (1) The nonaligned nations evaluate East and West in the same terms.
- (2) The nonaligned nations perceive the actions of the major powers toward the nonaligned also in the same terms.

At this point we consider data on these nations' perceptions of the major powers, first in terms of the combined orientation of the three states—India, Egypt, and Indonesia—and then by comparing the three in order to identify variations in perceptions. The data are presented in two forms: (a) summary indices for each dimension—affect, potency, and activity—in terms of three separate ratios each indicating orientation along that particular dimension; and (b) analysis of variance for each dimension, as a statistical test of significance for differences in expressed orientation. The summary indices tell us *how* the nonaligned nations perceive East and West along affect, potency, and activity; and the analyses of variance tell whether *differences* in their perceptions of East and West are statistically significant.

The first hypothesis argues that, since the nonaligned states have selected a non-belligerent posture in the general conflict system, it is not unlikely that they do not hold any preferences for either East or West. Table I presents data for

¹²Content analysis refers to systematic and objective methods of determining the characteristics of the written word. In the broadest terms, content analysis can be undertaken qualitatively or quantitatively. Our analysis is based primarily on automated content analysis, that is, the analysis of the verbal record through the use of computers from rapid data processing. For a detailed discussion of this method see Ole R. Holsti *et al.*, "Theory and Measurement of Interstate Behavior," unpublished ms., 1964.

¹³Although this is not a random sample of all speeches we shall attempt to generalize from this purposive and selected sample to these states' perceptions in general. For a more detailed discussion of this problem and related findings see the author's doctoral dissertation, "The Perceptual Base of Non-alignment," Stanford University, 1967.

TABLE I
PERCEPTIONS OF EAST AND WEST

Dimension	West	East
Negative	.561	.540
Strong	.856	.846
Active	.907	.730
<i>N</i>	495	210

Range = low (0.0) to high (1.0).

Dimension	<i>F</i> ratio	Critical region*		Decision†
		.05	.01	
Affect	0.17	3.92	6.84	Accept
Potency	2.14	3.92	6.84	Accept
Activity	2.95	3.92	6.84	Accept

N refers to the number of observations in each category.

*The values for the critical region are from Table X: 95th and 99th Percentile Values of the *F* Distribution, in Helen M. Walker and Joseph Lev, *Statistical Inference* (New York, 1953).

†The decision involved here is whether to accept or reject the hypothesized prevalence of no significant difference in the non-aligned states' perceptions of East and West.

the three nations' combined perceptions of the West and the Communist states, along with a measure of statistical significance. These data indicate that despite the absence of pronounced colonial background in Afro-Asia the Communist group is not viewed in significantly more favourable terms than the West. However, it may be misleading to consider results along the affect dimension as evidence of a marked disregard for the realities of cold war politics or a lack of differentiation between East and West, for these may reflect calculated rather than direct attitudes. To maintain a degree of consistency between verbal pronouncement and official policy, the nonaligned states could consciously avoid "leaning" to one side or the other. On the other hand, it is not unlikely that the data reveal uncalculated perceptions and that both East and West are, in fact, evaluated similarly along the affect dimension—and potency as well. In this respect one nonaligned leader stated:

International affairs are dominated today by the conflict between western powers and communist powers, more particularly, by the rivalry between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. And yet, in spite of the manifest differences, there is an amazing similarity between the two Super powers. . . . The real difference today is between the developed countries and those that are still under-developed.¹⁴

The impressive achievements of the Soviet Union in the twentieth century do not seem to have overshadowed those of the United States, and admiration for the rapid progress of the Soviets does not necessarily include a desire to emulate the methods adopted by the Russians:

We see today capitalist countries which have achieved a very high material standard of living for their people. We also see a tremendous advance in material well-being

¹⁴Jawaharlal Nehru, *India Today and Tomorrow* (New Delhi, 1959), 15.

and scientific and technological progress in the Soviet Union, achieved in a relatively short time. . . . there has been a good deal of violence and purges associated with the development of the Soviet Union.¹⁵

The data further suggest that the West is viewed as more active than the East. Although this finding is hardly unexpected, given the colonial history of Afro-Asia, it is not statistically significant. So far, at least, the issue of perceptual impartiality seems to have empirical validity. Whether this is a reflection of calculated or of unmediated perceptions is still an open question. Content analysis techniques do not yet differentiate "genuine" perceptions and calculated expressions.

Hypothesis 2 above argues that the nonaligned states assess the *actions* of the major powers in the same terms. However, the absence of sufficient data for perceptions of Communist actions has not made it possible to test this hypothesis for statistical significance. At best the summary indices yield some indication of orientation. These record a negative affect index for the East's actions as (1.0) and for the West as (.89), (.67) and (.90) along the potency dimension, and (0.0) and (1.0) along the activity dimension, respectively. On the basis of available data the hypothesis seems tenable along the affect dimension and possibly rejected in terms of potency and activity. In this respect, there is some evidence to suggest that Afro-Asian experiences with the Soviets and the Chinese—ranging from subtle diplomatic encounter to overt verbal confrontation—may indicate awareness of a Communist parallel to Western penetration in Afro-Asia. This was evident as early as the Bandung conference in 1955, when one commentator referred to the position of a prominent Afro-Asian leader on the question of colonialism in the following terms: ". . . he favored a clause on Colonialism which made reference to 'Colonialism of all types' because in our opinion, there is a sort of Colonialism on the Communist side and we thought it should be recognized."¹⁶

Although these nonaligned nations express similar orientations toward the major powers, it should be noted that in terms of salience—defined as frequency of expression—certain differences arise. Intentionally or otherwise, the Afro-Asian states generally voice greater concern over the actions of the West than those of the East, which may suggest perhaps that explicit references to Communist actions are expressed with acuteness or alternatively that the nonaligned are less sensitive to Communist than to Western activities. Aside from the issue of salience, then, there is marked absence of perceived distinctions between East and West. At this point the three countries' perceptions are compared to determine the extent to which individual attitudes reflect common orientations. Some differences in perceptions are to be expected, for each nation's policy is based on individual as well as shared motivations. Variations in perceptual orientation are presented in Table II along with a measure of statistical significance. The three leaders differ only minimally in their assessment of the major powers. The greatest variations occur along the affect dimension but these are not significant. In general, Nehru expressed the least perceptual distinction between East and West, viewing both with the same affective neutrality. Sukarno, on his part,

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 13-14.

¹⁶*Mideast Mirror*, April 1955.

TABLE II

VARIATIONS IN INDIAN, EGYPTIAN, AND INDONESIAN PERCEPTIONS OF EAST AND WEST

Dimension	West			East		
	India	Egypt	Indonesia	India	Egypt	Indonesia
Negative	.523	.715	.285	.562	.523	0.0
Strong	.680	.892	.950	.702	.680	1.0
Active	.758	.958	.941	.666	.758	.77
<i>N</i>	143	253	99	94	29	87

Range = Low (0.0) to high (1.0).

Leader*	Dimension	<i>F</i> ratio	Critical region		Decision†
			.05	.01	
Nehru	Affect	1.79	3.86	6.70	Accept
	Potency	0.93	4.11	7.39	Accept
	Activity	0.004	4.27	7.77	Accept
Sukarno	Affect	0.01	4.04	7.24	Accept
	Potency	3.52	4.08	7.31	Accept
	Activity	Data insufficient	4.08		

N refers to the number of observations in each category.

*Nasser's scores for East are insufficient to allow statistical test.

†The decision is whether or not to accept a hypothesized relationship of no significant difference in each leader's perceptions of East and West.

assessed the major powers in equally favourable terms. In contrast, Nasser seemed to draw considerable distinctions between the West and the Communists and perceived the former in more salient and more negative terms.

On the whole, there do not seem to be any significant variations in the three leaders' expressed perceptions of the major powers, and there is little evidence to reject the hypotheses tested in this section. East and West are not assessed in dissimilar terms, nor are their actions toward the nonaligned viewed as significantly different. In these limited respects, at least, the perceptual findings are congruent with official policy.

Overt behaviour

An important question in the context of this study is the degree of consistency between the policy of nonalignment and the actions of the nonaligned nations vis-à-vis the major powers. In assessing nonaligned behaviour, we are concerned less with "routine" actions such as trade and aid relationships, or with more "formal" patterns of behaviour, like votes in the General Assembly, but rather patterns of conflict and co-operation.¹⁷ The hypotheses examined in this

¹⁷"Routine" and "formal" behaviours are both significant indicators of behavioural orientation and are taken into account in the large study of which this paper is only a brief introduction. This section is designed primarily as a pilot study of the behaviour of non-aligned states along a co-operation-conflict dimension. The analysis is in a preliminary state and is presented in the most direct manner. In further analyses we intend to examine the data using more detailed and sophisticated methods. At this point our purpose is to present the preliminary and tentative findings.

section are designed to determine the extent to which the nonaligned nations' actions toward the major powers vary along a co-operation–conflict dimension¹⁸:

- (3) The nonaligned nations' actions toward East and West do not differ significantly.
- (4) The nonaligned nations do not display differing levels of co-operation toward East or West.

In an effort to test these hypotheses we have collected data on the behaviour of India, Egypt, and Indonesia toward the West and the Communist states.¹⁹ Close to 500 discrete acts have been gathered primarily from *Deadline Data* in consultation with the *New York Times Index*, *Encyclopedia Britannica Yearbook*,²⁰ and reliable means of evaluating inter-state behaviour.²¹ This method is based on the principle of inter-situational comparability whereby the scale in question can be used in the analysis of behaviour along a co-operation–conflict dimension regardless of the historical period in question, and provides an adequate and reliable “measuring rod.” The scale itself is composed of 30 items ranging from “nations initiate joint sovereignty” in terms of extreme co-operation to “nations escalate fighting” in terms of intense conflict. The 28 items separating these two thresholds range from high co-operation to increasing conflict.²²

Once the actions of the three nonaligned states were gathered, the identity of the actors and targets was then masked to allow for the unbiased ranking of behaviour.²³ The results yielded a frequency distribution of each nonaligned state's actions toward the East and the West separately according to level of intensity along the conflict dimension scale. To facilitate analysis and interpretation of behavioural data, the items for each state were aggregated into three categories according to low, medium, and high conflict implications. The Low-Conflict category includes a class of actions ranging from item (1) “nations A, B, . . . n initiate joint sovereignty, i.e. federate,” through item (10) “nations A, B, . . . begin formal talks,” in increasing intensity of conflict. The Medium-

¹⁸We are not testing for degree of integration with the major powers but for differences in terms of implications for conflict.

¹⁹The specific period considered extended from January 1954 to December 1962.

²⁰These sources are primarily Western and as such are likely to introduce some bias in the data. To compensate somewhat for this “slant,” we intend to examine Indian, Egyptian and Indonesian sources, primarily to assess the degree of consistency in the reporting of actions but also to complete our data collection wherever omissions in Western sources are evident. It should be noted, however, that we have no reason to believe that the data include biases which would distort the findings to a significant extent. Only future analyses will validate or reject this supposition.

²¹Lincoln E. Moses *et al.*, “Scaling Data on Inter-Nation Action,” *Science*, 156, no. 3778 (1967), 1054–9.

²²The 30-item scale is presented in Appendix A. Each data item is ordered along this scale according to the appropriate level of intensity, and our analysis is then based on the frequency of data items along each level of intensity. See below. This method is different from the Q-sort technique in that the latter allows for meaningful comparisons only within the one universe of actions being considered and cannot take into account inter-situation comparisons.

²³A subsequent experiment on the interaction scale recently conducted by Edward Azar at Stanford University indicated that masked data do not yield statistically significant different results from unmasked data. See his “Scaling Data on Inter-Nation Action: A Follow-up,” 1968. It seems, then, that for future analyses of the nonaligned nations' actions, it is not necessary to undertake the masking procedure.

Conflict category includes behaviour ranging from item (11) "nation *A* requests of nation *B* that they take a particular issue over which they differ to an international organization," through item (20) "members of the government of nation *A* return to an emergency meeting over nation *B*." And the High-Conflict category includes a group of actions extending from item (21) "nation *A* expels officials of nation *B*" through item (30) "nation *A* escalates fighting with nation *B*."²⁴ Admittedly such an aggregation greatly oversimplifies the inter-action processes in question,²⁵ but for our purposes it seems adequate. This procedure distinguishes only in the most general terms these nonaligned states' actions toward East and West, and should not be considered as conclusive by any means.²⁶

In the following analysis we compare the three nonaligned nations' actions toward the major powers first in terms of their combined scores, and then by separating each state's scores to determine the degree of variation among them. The combined actions toward East and West are presented in Table III along

TABLE III
ACTIONS TOWARD MAJOR POWERS IN TERMS
OF CONFLICT LEVELS

	East	West	<i>N</i>
Low	155	163	318
Medium	50	79	129
High	10	6	16
<i>N</i>	215	248	—

$\chi^2 = 5.4$ with 2 degrees of freedom: non-significant at the .05 level.

with a measure of statistical significance. It is clear that, in terms of frequency, at least, the nonaligned group's behavioural orientation toward the major powers—during the 1954–62 period—fell primarily in the low-conflict range. Although the data reflect evidence of higher levels of conflict as well, these are considerably less frequent. Statistically, the difference in the nonaligned nations' behaviour toward East and West along the co-operation–conflict dimension is not significant. A definite injustice is done to the subject matter by combining the scores for India, Egypt, and Indonesia; and interesting as those statistical results may be it is of greater relevance in "real world" terms to consider the three states' actions toward the major powers separately.

²⁴It should be noted that Moses *et al.* suggest that a 15-item scale is functionally equivalent, and just as effective, as the 30-item scale used here.

²⁵The non-aggregated scores for each state are presented in Appendix A. We have not conducted any reliability checks since the intensive pre-testing of this method indicated that a high reliability was found in the judges' rankings of different sets of data (Moses, *et al.*, 1967).

²⁶Our intent is, in future analyses, to analyse the unaggregated items for each state using analysis of variance as a means of testing for significant differences in the means of the respective distributions, comparing the three states and evaluating changes over time. This technique would take into account both the frequency and intensity of actions in terms of conflict value.

From the disaggregated data presented in Table IV it is clear that certain important relationships have been overshadowed by combining the scores of the three states. In the first place, Egypt differed from both India and Indonesia by expressing higher conflictual behaviour toward the West and greater co-operation with the East, whereas both India and Indonesia in their actions displayed greater co-operation toward the West (with no cases of high conflict)

TABLE IV

ACTIONS TOWARD THE MAJOR POWERS IN TERMS OF
CONFLICT VALUE: INDIA, EGYPT, INDONESIA

INDIA	East	West	<i>N</i>
Low	61	72	133
Medium	36	15	51
High	8	0	8
<i>N</i>	105	87	192

$\chi^2 = 13.31$ (when corrected for continuity 15.30) with 2 degrees of freedom: significant at .01.

EGYPT	East	West	<i>N</i>
Low	44	54	98
Medium	10	53	63
High	0	6	6
<i>N</i>	54	113	167

$\chi^2 = 16.66$ (when corrected for continuity 20.81) with 2 degrees of freedom: significant at .001.

INDONESIA	East	West	<i>N</i>
Low	50	37	87
Medium	4	11	15
High	2	0	2
<i>N</i>	56	48	104

$\chi^2 = 6.59$ (when corrected for continuity 6.21) with 2 degrees of freedom: significant at .05.

but evidence of high conflict toward the Communists. This difference is a function, in large measure, of historical, political, and circumstantial factors; for in contrast to the Indians and Indonesians, the Egyptians had relatively little contact with either China or the Soviet Union by mid-century. Initial interaction during the 1950s had been fairly cordial and vacillated periodically from warm to cool. The major bone of contention between them was Communist-expressed dissatisfaction with the Egyptian leadership's relentless pursuit of local Communists, a factor that featured prominently, but differentially, in the country's relations with both East and West. Egypt's relations with the West were governed by more specific and substantive problems which gave rise to overt displays of hostility on both sides. The chain of events following the United States' withdrawal of an initial offer of assistance in building the Aswan Dam is reflected

in Table IV in terms of frequency scores in the medium and high conflict categories.

In contrast, both India and Indonesia expressed lower levels of conflict toward the West than the Communists, although differences between them, in this respect, are evident. India's co-operative behaviour toward the West exceeded Indonesia in both frequency and intensity. The high conflict scores for actions toward the East in the Indian matrix are more a reflection of behaviour toward the People's Republic of China than the Soviet Union. The Indonesian matrix indicates only two instances of high conflict toward the East. In both cases these refer to restriction of alien travel in the country. Obviously, curtailment of foreign movement is not as intensive in conflict value as are armed hostilities. By aggregating items 21-30 of the interaction scale into one category termed "high conflict," a loss of information occurs and often subtle—or not so subtle—differences are overlooked.

In statistical terms, at least, the results evident in the combined scores support the hypothesized relationship in question. However, the individual scores indicate that in each case the difference in behaviour toward East and West is statistically significant at the .05 level. The inconsistency between combined and individual scores is most probably a function of the differences in the Indian and Indonesian patterns on the one hand and the Egyptian on the other. Even in terms of pure frequency counts, Egypt differs from both India and Indonesia. Egyptian actions during this period were primarily directed toward the Western nations, whereas the other two states' actions were more oriented, comparatively at least, toward the Communists.

The second hypothesis in this section asserts that the nonaligned states do not display differing levels of co-operation (low conflict) toward either East or West. Both the individual and combined matrices indicate that over half the actions recorded fall in the low-conflict category, in contrast to the relatively fewer frequencies of high conflict. It is almost self-evident that a high proportion of actions occur along the low-conflict direction of the interaction scale, since most interactions for most of the time are not overly laden with conflict value. A relationship that would shed doubt on this hypothesis would be a loading on the low-conflict actions toward the East that is different from the West. However, as long as the relationships that emerge—in terms of actions toward East and West—are relatively comparable, then our hypothesis cannot be rejected.

Actions, perceptions, and policy: a commentary

At this point we attempt to evaluate the perceptual and behavioural findings by discussing the last two hypotheses of this study:

- (5) The actions of nonaligned nations are congruent with their attitudes.
- (6) Overt behaviour and perceptual orientation are not incongruent with official policy.

Nonalignment as a policy is predicated, so it would seem, on an impartial assessment of the major powers. An examination of the speeches delivered by Nehru, Nasser, and Sukarno before Afro-Asian audiences revealed little per-

ceptual differentiation in orientation toward East and West. In contrast, the actions of India, Egypt, and Indonesia indicate some discrepancies in behaviour toward the cold-war antagonists. The differences between actions and perceptions perhaps suggest that hypothesis 5 should be rejected. On the basis of evidence above, it seems that perceptions are more consistent with policy than are actions, for, according to our formulation, actions would be congruent with policy if differences in behaviour toward the major powers were statistically non-significant. It appears, then, that hypothesis 6 should also be rejected.

A word of caution is in order. The formulations examined in the course of this study, simplistic as they may be, have been presented primarily as working hypotheses. It may be misleading to accept statements presented publicly as evidence of "genuine" perceptions, yet it may be equally misleading to reject such evidence outright. It may also be misleading seriously to expect nonaligned actions toward East and West to be identical in conflict value. Action is, in large part, reaction. And much of what has been considered here as nonaligned behaviour toward East and West should, more appropriately, be viewed in the context of the major powers' orientation toward India, Egypt, and Indonesia. Furthermore, the circumstances governing the relations of these states with the major powers were considerably different, and it is not reasonable to expect them to calculate their actions toward the major powers in terms of conflict intensity and an attempt to steer a middle course. These states are motivated just as much by "self-interest"—however vaguely it may be defined—as by rational calculations and official pronouncements.

Nonalignment as a policy defines only the broadest lines of behaviour or parameters of permissible actions. Beyond that nonalignment is not relevant. It may be doing an injustice to this policy to assume that it is designed to regulate actions and reactions. There are certain issues for which policy, as we have defined it, becomes a basic determinant of behaviour. But more often than not, it serves as a framework within which more specific actions are undertaken.

The obvious difficulty in assessing the results of our enquiry is that an attempt has been made to relate, theoretically and empirically, three different aspects of national orientation—policy, perceptions, and behaviour. Although the evidence generated in this study does indicate certain inconsistencies between these dimensions, such inconsistencies should be considered neither as a negation nor a contradiction of the official third-world position. The policy of nonalignment serves primarily to define parameters of possible actions. Beyond that, policy may have little bearing on actual behaviour.

Conclusion

This paper has focused on an early period in the development of Afro-Asian nonalignment; consequently any generalizations from the above findings to the current international scene should be undertaken with considerable caution. The bipolar structure of the international system evident in the mid 1950s and early 1960s has been replaced, to some extent, by a greater pluralism. The conditions that gave rise to this Afro-Asian posture are no longer dominant, yet remnants of these conditions, primarily in terms of the East-West conflict, are still in

evidence—not entirely superseded by the intricate network of inter-state relations today—perhaps suggesting that the position adopted by the third world during the period examined is still relevant to current conditions. Moreover, it would be misleading to overestimate the impact of the changing international environment on the policy and orientation of Afro-Asia, for states, like individuals, operate in large part on the basis of memory, learned behaviour, past experiences, stress toward consistency, and the like. Changes in policy often lag behind changes in the external environment and history has shown us that it is not unusual for states, like individuals, to hold on to positions regardless of changing conditions.

Appendix A

THE INTERACTION SCALE:
DISAGGREGATED SCORES FOR INDIA, EGYPT, AND INDONESIA

Level of increasing conflict	Action categories	East			West		
		India	Egypt	Indon.	India	Egypt	Indon.
1.	Nations <i>A, B, ... n</i> initiate joint sovereignty, i.e. federate	0	0	0	0	0	0
2.	Nations <i>A, B, ... n</i> enemies of nation <i>X</i> , integrate their military units	0	0	0	0	0	0
3.	Nations <i>A, B, ... n</i> form international military training facilities	0	0	0	0	0	3
4.	Nations <i>A</i> and <i>B</i> set up a joint study commission to study nation <i>B</i> 's problems	0	0	0	0	0	0
5.	Nations <i>A, B, ... n</i> , enemies of nation <i>X</i> , join in a mutual defence agreement	0	0	0	0	0	0
6.	Nation <i>A</i> increases its aid to nation <i>B</i>	8	21	5	11	8	4
7.	Nation <i>A</i> offers to provide facilities for weapons production	1	0	4	1	0	0
8.	Nation <i>A</i> grants nation <i>B</i> a loan	3	2	4	25	8	5
9.	High official of nation <i>A</i> visits nation <i>B</i>	14	6	17	22	5	10
10.	Nations <i>A, B</i> , begin formal talks on an issue over which they differ	35	15	20	13	33	15
11.	Nation <i>A</i> requests of nation <i>B</i> that they take a particular issue over which they differ to an international organization	2	0	0	0	2	0
12.	Nation <i>A</i> invites nation <i>B</i> to negotiate a particular issue over which they differ	5	3	0	0	2	4

Appendix A continued

Level increasing conflict	Action categories	East			West		
		India	Egypt	Indon.	India	Egypt	Indon.
13.	Nation <i>A</i> holds fleet manoeuvres at sea near a scene of possible trouble	0	0	0	0	1	0
14.	Formal talks between nations <i>A</i> and <i>B</i> break down	5	0	1	0	36	2
15.	Nation <i>A</i> increases its military aid to an enemy of nation <i>B</i>	0	1	0	0	1	0
16.	Nation <i>A</i> prohibits export of strategic materials to nation <i>B</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0
17.	Nation <i>A</i> makes a written protest to nation <i>B</i> concerning a specific action of nation <i>B</i>	22	6	1	15	9	4
18.	Nations <i>A</i> and <i>B</i> close their common frontier	0	0	0	0	0	0
19.	Nation <i>A</i> rejects nation <i>B</i> 's note of protest	0	0	1	0	2	1
20.	Members of the government of nation <i>A</i> return to an emergency meeting over nation <i>B</i>	2	0	1	0	0	0
21.	Nation <i>A</i> expels officials of nation <i>B</i>	2	0	0	0	1	0
22.	Nation <i>A</i> restricts the domestic travel of nationals of nation <i>B</i>	0	0	2	0	0	0
23.	Nation <i>A</i> prohibits exports to nation <i>B</i>	0	0	0	0	3	0
24.	Nation <i>A</i> threatens nation <i>B</i> with war if <i>B</i> does not meet <i>A</i> 's demands	2	0	0	0	1	0
25.	Nation <i>A</i> freezes the funds of nation <i>B</i> which are in the banks of nation <i>A</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0
26.	Nation <i>A</i> evacuates its civilian population from its frontier cities and towns	1	0	0	0	0	0
27.	Nation <i>A</i> makes intrusions into nation <i>B</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0
28.	Nation <i>A</i> cuts off diplomatic relations with nation <i>B</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0
29.	Nations <i>A</i> and <i>B</i> engage in light frontier fighting						
30.	Nation <i>A</i> escalates fighting with nation <i>B</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0